

# **Making Good Citizens**

Education and Civil Society

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33. Peter Beinart, "Education: The Rise of Jewish Schools," *Atlantic Monthly* 284 (October 1998).
34. For one example, see George M. Marsden, *The Outrageous Idea of Christian Scholarship* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
35. Draft Text of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, Implementation Document, by Subcommittee of U.S. Bishops' Ad Hoc Committee on the Implementation of "Ex Corde Ecclesiae," *Origins: CNS Documentary News Service* 28 (December 3, 1998).
36. See J. Donald Monan, S.J., and Edward A. Malloy, C.S.C., "Ex Corde Ecclesiae Creates an Impasse," *America*, January 30, 1999.

## Chapter 13 Religion and Education: American Exceptionalism?

Charles L. Glenn

The world of K–12 schooling in the United States is regularly troubled by controversies over religion. "School wars" (as they were often called) of this sort were a primary focus of political life in Europe in the nineteenth century, but they are so no longer. How did France and Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, and other Western democracies manage to get beyond these troubling issues? Why does public life in the United States have such difficulty accommodating the diverse religious concerns of parents?

Controversies over American education occur on two quite distinct levels. Policy specialists, education organizations, and business groups worry about the quality of public schools: do they set high enough expectations? Why is the quality so uneven? What accounts for the complacency of many students who are learning much less than their European or Asian counterparts? The policy debates also call into question whether various strategies to improve the schools could have unanticipated negative consequences. Reducing class size might have a negative effect on teacher quality. Stress on measurable outcomes

might sacrifice valuable educational objectives that are not easily measured. And so it goes . . .

Few parents are troubled by these questions—though perhaps they should be—but many are deeply concerned about the disparity between what they believe is healthy and good for their children and what they believe is provided in school. Many show their concern by taking their children out of the public schools, and a rapidly growing number are schooling their children at home. Stephen Carter reported, in his 1995 Massey Lectures, that he frequently meets “people who complain that the deck is stacked against a family trying to teach what they often call ‘traditional values’ or ‘family values.’ . . . There is a widely shared perception that the institutions of the government, far from reinforcing the values many people want their children to learn, actively frustrate them.”<sup>1</sup> It is in relation to public schools that parental disappointment and even suspicion are most acute.

Some of these discontented parents are troubled by the way the public schools seem to dismiss their own religious beliefs or moral codes. Other parents object when—perhaps in the name of “multi-culturalism”—their children are exposed to any religious beliefs or practices at all. Teachers may come under criticism for seeking to promote their own beliefs . . . or unbelief. Pupils are told that they cannot use religious themes that are meaningful to them in their homework. Too often, these conflicts between the worldviews of parents and those that are presented to their children in public school end up in court.

Why is this a problem? More is at stake in these conflicts even than ebbing support for public schools and growing interest in vouchers and home-schooling. Ironically, the public schools, which Horace Mann and other nineteenth-century reformers saw as the unifying institution of a diverse and rapidly changing society, have become an occasion of disunity. This is evident, for example, in the great difficulty that policy makers have in developing educational standards specific enough to serve as the basis for accountability. It is evident also in the inability of most public high schools to engage their students in a way that leads to academic effort and thus to the virtuous habits of application and persistence. “Across the country, whether surrounded by suburban affluence or urban poverty,” Laurence Steinberg and his associates found, “students’ commitment to school is at an all-time low.”<sup>2</sup> It is tempting to attribute this disengagement—and consequent mediocre achievement—to the self-indulgence characteristic of the wider culture, but in fact by international standards American adults work unusually hard and productively at their jobs. Something else is going on in public secondary schools; they have become

“shopping malls” that cater to every taste and allow students to decide whether or not they will make an effort. Public schools have become incapable of communicating that their academic mission is important. This contrasts with Linda Valli’s description of the “curriculum of effort” in the Catholic high school, where “the school’s emphasis on effort is assisted by an archdiocesan policy that no student fail because of ability. . . . Tracking is viewed by students as one school effort to keep them from failing courses too difficult for them. . . . Some teachers pass students if they do their homework but fail quizzes, but automatically fail students if they neglect a certain amount of homework. This focus on effort is not lost on students.”<sup>3</sup>

The incoherence of the public high school, which makes it unable to engage students effectively in their own learning, grows in large part out of the conflicting worldviews that public schools must accommodate. Staff do not, unless by sheer and unlikely accident, share the same understanding of the nature of human life and the conditions of its flourishing, nor have parents chosen the school. In contrast, “instead of a neutrality shaped by conflicting values among school participants, private schools seek agreement about institutional purpose. Ideally families and schools are fused in a single community of values. . . . Instead of promoting individualization by the presence of boundless opportunities and the absence of restraints, private schools attempt to promote it by giving intimate personal attention.” This agreement about school purpose is especially important for average students. But many teachers accept as inevitable and desirable the neutrality of the shopping mall high school. It is the price that has to be paid to accommodate the entire spectrum of adolescent values and capacities. One teacher admitted that his school had no clear commitment to learning, only a clear commitment to accommodating student diversity.<sup>4</sup>

Although vouchers and standards are debated by policy elites as competing methods for reform through bringing market forces to bear on stagnant schools, their resonance with parents has much more to do with the possibility of choosing a school based on a coherent worldview and a clearly articulated academic mission. Parents are (unfortunately) not up in arms about the general mediocrity of academic expectations in American schools, but many are anxious about the messages that are being communicated to their children.

It should not be surprising that religion is a source of controversy for American education. After all, the slogan of “educational neutrality” is naive when it is not disingenuous. To educate is to take a stand for a particular understanding of what life is about and how its challenges should be met. The teacher who communicates that such questions are unimportant, or that any answer to

them is as good as any other, is not being neutral—he or she is expressing a viewpoint that may be as intolerantly proselytizing as any other. Americans are a highly religious people who send their children to schools organized on the basis of a local monopoly of public education. The reality that this system is secularistic—by no means neutral between the claims of religious and materialist understandings of reality—is a formula for conflict. For two generations American public schools have suffered from a sort of low-grade fever which has never become a major political crisis but cumulatively has undermined their capacity to educate with undivided conviction. Teachers are forced to teach defensively, in schools that have become incoherent.<sup>5</sup>

When teachers and parents come together around shared and clearly articulated goals, there is a much greater prospect than in monopoly systems that effective education will occur and that students will buy into the mission of the school. Something else happens, as well: trust and habits of cooperation are developed as adults discuss and negotiate about matters important to children. Schools that are not enmeshed in bureaucracy help to develop, in adult participants, the characteristics upon which a healthy civil society depends. It was no accident that the creation of independent schools was one of the first signs of a reviving civil society in postcommunist eastern Europe and is a matter of pressing concern in our own inner cities.<sup>6</sup>

How has it come about that the United States, so much less “secular” than western Europe, as measured by church attendance and surveys of religious belief, is so much more secular when it comes to educational policy? Although almost every country in Europe provides public funds to faith-based schools, this is—in principle at least—forbidden in the United States. And though the famous “wall of separation” is showing some cracks, it continues to be an absolute article of faith in American public education circles.

There are obviously two ends to this puzzling contrast. One is the rigid separation of government from religious activities (or at least from those affecting elementary and secondary schooling) in the United States; the other, the lack of such a ‘bright line’ in the sociologically much more secularized societies of Europe.

European nations (as well as Canada and Australia) have chosen to provide public funding to schools with an explicitly religious character, in contrast with the “strict separation” practiced in the United States. What explains this greater readiness to accommodate the religious convictions of some parents in societies that are in fact highly secularized? There are a number of reasons, no one of which alone would explain this phenomenon.

## HISTORICAL ROOTS

First, there are historical commonalities and differences. The development of universal schooling in Europe, as in the United States, took place against the background of the transformation from agricultural to industrialized societies. Rootless urban workers seemed much more dangerous than peasants going through their immemorial routines. Concerned about the rapid changes in the character of their societies, elites came to believe that schooling should be extended to the entire population. “For a post-Enlightenment, nineteenth-century West, education stood out as a god and an engine of progress. Faith in its beneficial results, for states, societies, and individuals, was one of the premier tenets of the world view that emerged in the era.”<sup>7</sup>

Accompanying the confidence in progress was an anxiety among elites about social control of the newly mobile population gathered in cities and other industrial areas. Universal schooling seemed not only an instrument of progress but also a way to tame the masses. In particular, it was hoped, schooling would disseminate a national spirit to replace regional loyalties, as the national language would replace local dialects and minority languages. Schooling under state supervision would be a way to bind together nations that were emerging from dynastic states or (in the American, Canadian, and Australian cases) from loosely linked colonies.

As “progressive,” change-oriented elites sought to hasten the pace and control the direction of social change through developing systems of universal schooling, they came up inevitably against the traditional role of churches as the educators of the people. In Great Britain, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and those areas of Germany with established Protestant churches, the solution was simple: government subsidized the official church’s schools, or where these were lacking established its own with primary oversight exercised by the clergy of the state church. Little tension was felt between the educational interests of church and state; theologians like Schleiermacher in Prussia and Hofstede de Groot in the Netherlands served as government school inspectors, as did—for thirty-five years—the writer Matthew Arnold in England.<sup>8</sup> In the Netherlands, in Canada, in Great Britain, and in Germany, strong Catholic minorities were accommodated by providing parallel Catholic and Protestant educational systems, with the latter gradually emptied of distinctive religious character.

In predominantly Catholic countries like France and Belgium, Italy and Spain, however, conflict developed very soon between secular elites and church leaders over the control of popular schooling.<sup>9</sup> Blame for this conflict rests on

both sides. To the progressive elites, Catholicism was, as Voltaire and other *philosophes* had insisted several generations earlier, a barrier to progress, incapable of making any positive contribution to society. For Catholic leadership, still recoiling from the persecution and the anti-Christian propaganda of the French Revolution's radical phase, no compromise was possible with liberalism and democracy. This mutual antagonism was only reinforced by political events during the course of the nineteenth century. In France, for example, the Revolution of 1848 had anticlerical dimensions and was followed by a period of Catholic support for the imposition of order by the prince-president, soon Napoleon III. Similarly, the violence of the Commune in 1871, which included the murder of the archbishop of Paris, was followed by another period of Catholic reaction, which in turn led to a phase of deliberate limitations upon the political influence of the Catholic Church. With each turn of events, control of popular schooling was a central issue. Similar (though not generally as dramatic) events occurred over the course of the century in other countries with a largely Catholic population.

The primary controversies over religion and education in western Europe were not about whether religion should be taught in state-supported schools; but about the extent of government control over those schools. In Germany almost all state schools were either Catholic or Protestant until the postwar period, but there were few nonstate schools. In the Netherlands and Belgium, by contrast, the number and enrollment of nonstate schools came to exceed that of the schools operated by public authorities. The massive demonstrations over educational policy in France and Spain in 1984 were in reaction to efforts by socialist governments to gain greater control over Catholic and other nonpublic schools supported with public funds.

In the United States, however, the demand for religious schooling came to be identified with efforts of Catholic and, to a lesser extent, Protestant, immigrant groups to maintain aspects of their distinctiveness. This apparent threat to the U.S. social and political order was perceived as deeply threatening by the native Protestant majority, and they were willing to purge public schools of what had been their religious character in order to meet (though without ever satisfying) objections to them by Catholic leadership.<sup>10</sup> As a result, the development of American education was different in two fundamental respects from that in western Europe and even in Canada: government-operated schooling came to be nonreligious, and church-operated schooling received no public funding.

#### PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

A second reason for the puzzling—to most Americans—European support for nonpublic schools, most of them with a religious character, is that these schools are far more integrated into the public education system than is the case in the United States. They operate within a framework of accountability and outcome standards; nowhere in Europe is it assumed that if policy makers simply “let the market rip,” the result will be adequate and equitable. The requirements placed upon “free schools” (the term used in preference to “private schools”) are essentially the same as those placed by government upon schools operated by municipalities, though the former are considerably freer of ordinary bureaucratic requirements.

These requirements include, in general, a national (or, in the case of Germany, a state) curriculum that specifies in some detail the subjects which must be covered and the number of hours to be devoted to each; rules about the qualifications, salaries, and working conditions of teachers; and tests that students must take at major points of transition.<sup>11</sup> Although testing is less frequent than in the United States, the consequences of the tests tend to be more significant; this has a definite effect on individual schools, whether operated by government or not, as well as on the seriousness with which pupils and teachers take their work.<sup>12</sup>

European nonpublic schools, unlike those in the United States, play by the same quality control rules as do public schools, and their teachers, unlike teachers in the United States, belong to a unified profession whether they work in public or in nonpublic schools. One result of this similarity is that there is little political challenge to the inclusion of these schools on equal terms in public funding. In particular, there is nothing like the entrenched opposition of the American teachers' unions to public funding for nonpublic schools. European teachers' unions seek instead to expand government control over nonpublic schools and in particular to impose upon them the same employment conditions as in government-operated schools.

This creates its own problems, of course. Much debate goes on about whether and to what extent nonpublic schools continue to be distinctive and thus fill a useful role in society. Groups that are opposed to religious schooling for ideological reasons suggest on the one hand that if nonpublic schools are really different from public schools, they can only exacerbate the growing divisions within society as a result of the presence of Muslim immigrants; on the

other hand, if nonpublic schools are not really different, critics say, they have no reason to exist. Catch-22! But such objections have found little support, and generally all political parties support continued subsidies for nonpublic schools.

More dangerous, many supporters of religious schooling believe, is the temptation they face to conform to the model provided by public schools, especially as the ever-increasing burden of regulation and standards reduces the scope for distinctiveness. Nor is government alone to blame. Staff and governing boards of nonpublic schools may drift into conformity with prevailing norms for education, and all the more because public funding removes the necessity of defining their mission clearly to supporters within a religious community.<sup>13</sup>

#### THE COMMITMENT TO RELIGIOUS AND EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM

The loss by nonpublic schools of their distinctive character is a political as well as an educational issue in western Europe. The public funding provided to faith-based schools is understood as a basic human right and as a political accommodation of the demands of parents, not as a market mechanism to improve the quality of education. If these schools no longer correspond to what parents motivated by religious convictions want and are entitled to for their children, they fail in their mission of providing an institutional support to religious freedom.

Americans are inclined to pay little attention to the abstraction of universal "human rights" and to focus instead upon those rights protected by our Bill of Rights and by state and federal laws. Perhaps this is a result of the remarkable stability and continuity of our legal system over the past two centuries. In most other countries, however, the international covenants adopted in the wake of World War II and in revulsion against fascism are taken seriously as a protection against arbitrary government action.

The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (adopted in 1948) states that "parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children" (article 26, 3).<sup>14</sup> Of course, this goes no further than the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *Pierce v. Society of Sisters* (268 U.S. 510 [1925]) and does not require that government subsidize the choices of parents. Similarly, the language of the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (1966) affirms that "the States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents . . . to choose for their children

schools, other than those established by public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions" (article 13, 3). Like the *Pierce* decision, this clause asserts a right of parents without a corresponding duty of government to ensure that parents can exercise that right. Indeed, the only duty of government implied here is to set educational standards and to ensure that non-government schools meet them. This, too, is parallel to the language in *Pierce* affirming "the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise, and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare."

By contrast, the First Protocol to the *European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* (1952) provides that "in the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions" (article 2). There is a subtle but significant shift evident in this language. To the extent that governments do anything about education, it suggests, they should do it in an even-handed way that does not make it more difficult for parents to provide their children with a religious than a secular education. And whereas the other covenants have largely a moral effect, compliance with the *European Convention* is monitored by the European Commission for Human Rights and enforced against member governments by the European Court in Strasbourg. It has teeth.

It seems unlikely that such language would have been adopted by the Council of Europe if it did not reflect what is already the practice in most of its member states.

#### POPULAR DEMAND

Despite widespread secularization, there continues to be strong demand, in a number of European countries, for faith-based schooling. This is true even of many parents who themselves profess no religious convictions. This demand seems to arise from a perception that schools with a religious character are more effective than the schools operated by government, both academically and in

supporting broad educational development. Research evidence from the Netherlands supports that from the United States and Great Britain in suggesting that schools with a religiously based ethos have an advantage over schools committed to value neutrality.<sup>15</sup>

A nationwide study of the effectiveness of Dutch secondary schools found that both Protestant and Catholic schools produced better results on cognitive measures and also on the satisfaction of students and teachers than did government-operated schools. The author concluded that this result had to do in large part with the clarity of identity of the former, and urged that public schools seek to develop something of the same quality.<sup>16</sup> Another Dutch study found that "after allowing for social background, primary school career, preceding career in secondary education and present school features, the Protestant sector effect leads to relatively high achievement, giving them a considerable advantage over other students. . . . Of the Protestant school students, 51% enroll in college and university education, whereas only 40% of the public school students and 45% of the Catholic school students take this decision." The study concluded that "if private schools produce better outcomes for nearly the same price and if parents perceive this quality of schools correctly, it is a rational decision for parents to send their children to private schools, despite their own religious preferences." According to the authors, this confirmed American research showing a religious school advantage, since "our research suggests that sector effects remain when the effects of selection and self-selection due to an unequal government support of private and public schools are eliminated."<sup>17</sup>

To the extent that the American, British, and Dutch researchers are correct, it is not just the relative or complete autonomy of most religious schools that gives them an advantage in effectiveness (as Chubb and Moe seem to believe), but also the moral coherence that they derive from a shared ethos.<sup>18</sup> "Consensus on goals, high expectations for students and the like could be reflections of the cultural aspects of schools rather than their rational aspects, tied more closely to social organization and to a community of values . . . than to role compliance within a bureaucratic structure."<sup>19</sup>

Whether from the intuitions of parents or the research of scholars, the apparent advantage of faith-based schools poses a challenge to public schooling. One response is to seek to bring nonpublic schools under the same disadvantages as public schools by greatly increasing the regulatory and procedural burden they must bear; this was, as we have seen, the cause of massive protests by parents in France and Spain in 1984. Another response would be to free public

schools to function more like nonpublic schools, as in the case of charter schools in the United States. Experiments along these lines have been common in recent years in Europe, from the Thatcher government's initiative to allow schools to "opt out" of their local school systems, to various measures in Germany and the Netherlands to increase the autonomy of public schools, to French experiments with nongeographical attendance as a way to promote parental choice.

A more daring possibility, suggested by Bryk, Lee, and Holland in the United States, would be to create a secular ideology of sufficient power to take the place of religious belief as the ethos at the heart of a school.<sup>20</sup> This idea resurfaces periodically in France, where, under the challenge of increased ethnic and cultural diversity, some have argued for a new definition of *laïcité* (secularity, in the sense of a humanistic worldview) that takes into account the growing diversity of French society "without surrendering to relativism from above or tribalism from below." France needs, they say, to rediscover a set of values that could without apology be taught to all students, taking into account "the situation of ethical pluralism in which contemporary France finds itself." Louis Legrand asked hopefully whether "the concept of man in the world that emerges from anthropology would not make it possible to establish a new unifying ethic, acceptable to all." A shared search for truth would replace religion as a source of meaning, and "the tolerance thus developed would be the cement of a secular and democratic society." Only through such an ethos could the "common school" (*l'école unique*) continue to exert a broadly educating influence.<sup>21</sup> But efforts to create a secular equivalent of religion have proved no more successful in the late twentieth century than they did in the late eighteenth (with Robespierre's Cult of Reason) or in the mid-nineteenth (with Comte's Religion of Humanity) or, indeed, in the mid-twentieth, with Dewey's proposal that a "common faith" of secular humanism be made the basis for education and social progress.<sup>22</sup>

No, millions of parents in secularized western Europe continue to choose schools for their children that are based on the traditional faiths. This preference seems to reflect what could be called broadly cultural concerns for which religion serves as an organizing principle. In Belgium, for example, research in the 1970s found that, quite apart from social class and income, there continued to be differences in lifestyle and in moral convictions and behavior between those who chose Catholic and those who chose public schools. Given this pattern, the growing secularization of Belgian society has not led to the decline of

Catholic “free” schools, which continue to serve the majority of school-age children in Belgium. Among parents who did not attend church but were rooted in a Catholic milieu, three out of four sent their children to a Catholic school. Billiet suggested that the Catholic milieu—including its schools—might be coming to take the place of the church for many secularized Belgians. After all, “a change in religious convictions and practices is not necessarily accompanied, on the structural level, by the abandonment of networks of social relationships, and in addition there can be a development, on the cultural level, of a sort of surrogate for churchliness.”<sup>23</sup>

In the Netherlands, debate breaks out periodically over whether there is an excessive supply of Protestant and Catholic schooling in view of the low church attendance. One survey cited to support that position asked parents what reasons were important or unimportant in choosing a secondary school. For critics of the present system of support for confessional education, it was significant that only 12 percent of the parents said that it was very important that the school “base its education on the religion or worldview of our family.” On the other hand, the “important” and “very important” responses on this item were a combined 40 percent. By comparison, 31 percent of parents found the quality of the school building important or very important. For 88 percent it was important or very important that the school “operate on the basis of ideas about the education of children that we support.”<sup>24</sup>

What can we make of such results? Certainly not that choice is unimportant to Dutch parents, such that they could be satisfied with a single type of schooling: for seven out of eight the educational philosophy of a school is important, and it is fair to assume that this means they are not satisfied with every variety. Religious identity of a school is less significant as a motivation for making a particular choice, though 40 percent represents a large constituency.

Researchers working in the Utrecht area asked parents about their primary reason for selecting an elementary school. Of 666 sets of parents who responded to the written inquiry, 70 percent stated that school quality was the most important consideration, and for only 22 percent was the particular religious character of the school the most important. This seemed to suggest that there was an oversupply of religious schooling in the Netherlands, but this conclusion is misleading. Many parents who value schooling shaped by a particular religious tradition would nevertheless put quality even higher; indeed, it is striking that as many as 30 percent of the parents were willing to give quality the second place to another school characteristic. A more satisfactory analysis

of the strength of motivation would ask what proportion of parents would accept a school at some distance from their home (in a country where children must get themselves to school). Considered in this way, the figures suggest a rather different picture: 54 percent of the parents regarded the religious character of the school as more important than the distance from home to school. It is fair to conclude, then, that for something more than half of the parents, the religious or ideological characteristics of the school were an important consideration in making a selection. For 27 percent of the parents, religious character was more important than quality, while for 44 percent it was the least important consideration.

This study provides an opportunity to compare the proportion of Dutch parents who characterized themselves as having religious convictions with the proportion with a preference for particular school choices. Of the total sample, 35 percent identified themselves as Protestant or Catholic, 50 percent expressed a preference for a Protestant or Catholic school, and 32 percent expressed a preference for a public school. If this sample is representative of the Netherlands as a whole, there is an almost exact correspondence between the proportion wanting public schools and the proportion of total elementary enrollment in such schools. These results do not suggest a fundamental mismatch between parental wishes and the availability of nonreligious public education.<sup>25</sup>

As in Belgium, it appears that the choice of faith-based schools in the Netherlands reflects general cultural preferences for many parents whose specifically religious views do not correspond with those of the school. In the early 1970s, a study was made of the reasons that parents chose Protestant schools. For 77 percent of the parents, the Christian character of the instruction was an important consideration, and 69 percent wanted a school that would shield children from “worldly ideas.” A third important motive had to do with the atmosphere of the school: the Protestant school was seen as more concerned with the happiness and personal development of the child and less with worldly success, and teachers were seen as more approachable. This group of parents placed the primary responsibility for education on parents (69 percent) rather than on the government (21 percent) or the churches (4 percent). When asked how Protestant schools differed from public schools, far more gave answers related to atmosphere and values than to “quality” as such.<sup>26</sup>

In short, there seems to be broad and continuing support for faith-based schooling in western Europe, despite the extensive secularization of most European societies compared with the United States.

## DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO ACCOMMODATING RELIGION IN EDUCATION

Although we can learn a good deal by comparing the European approach to accommodating religious conviction in publicly funded education with the American refusal to make such accommodations, we should also note some differences among the European systems. Emerging as compromises from nineteenth-century struggles over the control of schooling, these arrangements include both government schools with a religious character, as in Germany and Great Britain, and equal funding for nongovernment schools, as in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands. The first alternative has come to seem less attractive than the second to those who wish faith-based schooling, because nongovernment schools have somewhat greater autonomy and scope to maintain the distinctive religious flavor of the education provided . . . and to maintain other characteristics which many parents value in the schooling of their children. Indeed, over recent decades, in Germany and in much of Canada government schools with a Protestant character have surrendered that character and become religiously neutral alternatives to Catholic schools. These, in turn, perhaps because of more formalized connections with an institutional church, have retained their identity, however attenuated it may be in practice.

### Germany

In most of the states that came together to form Germany in the late nineteenth century, public schooling was overwhelmingly confessional, and this pattern continued in the predominantly Catholic states North Rhine–Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Bavaria even after World War II.<sup>27</sup> During the postwar period, the predominantly Protestant states opted for nonconfessional schools, while making provision for public funding of nongovernment confessional schools. This reflects the fact that in recent decades the Protestant state churches have made much less use than has the Catholic Church of the opportunity to insist upon confessional schools. Seventy-one percent of the elementary schools in Germany were Protestant in 1911, and 56 percent were Protestant in 1932, but by 1965 only 17 percent of public elementary schools in the Federal Republic (apart from the three city-states Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin) were Protestant, compared with 40 percent that were Catholic and 43 percent nonconfessional or other.<sup>28</sup> The accommodation of religious convictions in German education began to weaken during the 1960s, not least because the convictions themselves weakened through growing secularization. Protes-

tant leaders came out in formal support of nonconfessional schools in 1958, and through the next decade many schools gave up their Protestant identity. Catholic bishops fought a rearguard action, but with declining support from parents. A referendum in 1968, for example, overwhelmingly approved an amendment to the Bavarian constitution that made all public elementary schools “Christian” or interconfessional, with some instruction on a confessional basis. Where public confessional (mostly Catholic) schools continue to exist in Germany, they are operated by local school authorities and are subject to essentially the same controls as nonconfessional public schools.

Although the role of state-sponsored confessional schooling has faded in postwar Germany, that of nongovernment independent schools, while still numerically insignificant, has grown somewhat. Article 7 of the federal constitution guarantees the rights of nongovernment education.<sup>29</sup> The first section, in the German tradition, states that “the entire educational system shall be under the supervision of the state.” The next section asserts a limited right of parents “to decide whether [the child] shall receive religious instruction,” which is offered in most schools, as provided under the third section. This is as far as the constitution goes in asserting a right of parents to make decisions about the schooling of their children. Nevertheless, some argue that to the extent that the state’s own educational system does not provide the variety of forms of schooling—whether religious or pedagogical or structural—desired by parents, the state is under a constitutional obligation to provide support to independent schools to meet that demand.<sup>30</sup>

The fourth section of Article 7 guarantees “the right to establish nongovernment schools” but then makes them subject to government approval if they are to serve as a replacement for municipal schools. The approval “must be given” if they are equal to public schools “in their educational aims, their facilities and the professional training of their teaching staff.” Another requirement is that the operation of the nongovernment school not have the effect of promoting “segregation of pupils according to the means of their parents.” Finally, the “economic and legal position of the teaching staff” employed by the nongovernment school must be ensured. Thus the right to establish a nongovernment school is in fact highly circumscribed under the German constitution. While state laws in the United States may require that nongovernment schools provide an education equivalent to that available in local public schools, the schools’ right of existence is not limited by considerations of social class integration or the interests of teachers, as it is in Germany.

Limitations are even more apparent in the fifth section of the German con-

stitution, which specifies that a nongovernment elementary school will be permitted “only if the education authority finds that it serves a special pedagogical interest, or if, in the application of persons entitled to bring up children, it is to be established as an interdenominational or denominational or ideological school and a state or municipal elementary school of this type does not exist in the community.” In other words, there must be an explicit educational justification for a nongovernment elementary school, and it is not sufficient to cite the quality of the instruction provided. The school must have some pedagogical, religious, or ideological specialty that is not available in the local public schools. These additional conditions applicable to elementary education (grades 1 through 4) are based on “the interest of the state in pupils from all sectors of the population receiving a common basic education.”<sup>31</sup> As a consequence, the proportion of all pupils attending nonpublic schools is only 2 percent at the elementary level, compared with 8 percent at the secondary. Leaving it up to public-education authorities to decide whether a particular form of schooling “serves a special pedagogical interest” has had the effect of reducing significantly the diversity of German education. For example, an independent alternative school might be turned down on the grounds that no experimental justification exists because similar schools already exist elsewhere.<sup>32</sup>

Controversy has arisen over the extent to which public funds should subsidize the right of parents to make choices among schooling alternatives for their children. As early as 1955 the argument was made that a right guaranteed by the constitution should be secured by public funding—especially if independent schools were to be required to be equivalent to state-funded schools.<sup>33</sup> Initially, state education officials agreed among themselves that the language of Section 7 of the constitution guaranteeing the right to nongovernment schooling did not create an obligation to provide public funding to nongovernment schools. A Federal Administrative Court ruling in 1966 found, however, that the stringent conditions for approval of nongovernment substitute schools would be impossible to meet without subsidies.

The provision of subsidies did not put the issue to rest, however, because the ruling left it up to the *Länder* to determine how best to meet their obligation to make it possible for nongovernment schooling to survive. The actual practices varied. The Federal Constitutional Court issued a ruling in April 1987 based upon the constitutional guarantee that “everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality” (article 2.1) that went further than ever before in asserting a right to publicly funded nongovernment education. The case was brought by several state-approved nongovernment schools in Hamburg that

had been receiving a public subsidy of 25 percent of the costs of comparable public schools. The nongovernment schools pointed out that they were having difficulty surviving with this level of support and that confessional schools in Hamburg were receiving a 77 percent subsidy. The government responded that “the function of nongovernment schools consists of the widening and enrichment of the public school system through alternative offerings.” Experience had shown that the greatest demand for such alternatives was for confessional schools on the one hand and for “reform-pedagogical” schools on the other. “The higher support for schools with a distinctive worldview rests in the final analysis on their reliance [upon this support], developed through many years of constant demand. Confessional schools have always played a special role in the German educational system. For this reason, but also as a matter of duty, in order to make up for the closing [by the Nazi government] of the confessional schools in 1939, Hamburg gave them a high level of support in the years after the War.”<sup>34</sup> The court concluded that Hamburg could not treat the support of nongovernment schools as a matter of its absolute discretion, so as to make them prosper or decline as seemed best to public officials. The constitution recognized the right to operate nongovernment schools as based on the concern for human dignity, for the unfolding of personality in freedom and self-direction, for freedom of religion and conscience, for the neutrality of the government in relation to religion and worldview, and for respect of the natural rights of parents.

It was not enough, the court found, for the government simply to allow nongovernment schools to exist; it must give them the possibility to develop according to their own uniqueness. Without public support, such self-determination would not be possible. Nongovernment schools could not, at current cost levels, meet the requirements for government approval out of their own resources. To expect them to do so, the court ruled, would inevitably force them to become exclusive schools for the upper classes. But this was precisely contrary to the constitution’s decree that nongovernment schools not cause economic segregation. Nongovernment schools must remain accessible for all, not in the sense that they need accept every qualified student but in the sense that economic circumstances not function as a barrier to attendance. “Only when [nongovernment schooling] is fundamentally available to all citizens without regard to their personal financial situations can the [constitutionally] protected educational freedom actually be realized and claimed on an equal basis by all parents and students. . . . This constitutional norm must thus be considered as a mandate to lawmakers to protect and promote private schools.”<sup>35</sup> The con-

stitutional right to the free development of personality requires, Jach argues, that the state abstain from defining a single model of maturity that all schools should strive to develop in their pupils. In particular, it should recognize that the goal of individualization does not necessarily point toward the liberal model of the free-standing individual but may rather require meaningful participation in a community. Simply to proclaim "toleration" as the fundamental principle of public schools does not satisfy the developmental need of children to form secure identities in relation to such communities. The state is thus obligated to make it possible for young citizens to have a variety of types of schooling, based upon different concepts of the meaning of "development of personality," and to support independent schools to the extent that public schooling does not include the necessary diversity.<sup>36</sup>

#### The Netherlands

The Dutch have developed a very different model of the relation between government and faith-based schools, with government directly operating only about 30 percent of the elementary and secondary schools and paying the running costs of approved schools that it does not operate. Most nonpublic schools are either Catholic or Protestant, but there are also Jewish, Muslim, and Hindu schools as well as nonreligious alternative schools of various types, all funded by the national government. The constitutional guarantee of educational freedom has been applied to ensure that most parents have access to the sort of school that they wish for their children within a reasonable distance, not so difficult in this densely populated country.

The role of religiously identifiable institutions of all kinds continues to be significant in Dutch society despite widespread secularization, which has proceeded much further than in the United States. Ninety-four percent of those surveyed in the United States in 1995 said that they believed in God; the comparable response for the Netherlands was 55 percent. In the United States, 93 percent reported that they belonged to a church, though only 34 percent had attended church in the previous week; comparable figures for the Netherlands were 44 percent and 16 percent. The major denominations—Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed (*Hervormde*), and evangelical (*Gereformeerde*)—have all suffered major losses in recent decades, while a growing number of smaller religious groups have emerged.

Despite this extensive secularization, however, there continues to be support for institutions with a religious identity. Approximately 35 percent of Dutch parents prefer a faith-based school for their own children. The support is much

stronger among the more "evangelical" *Gereformeerden*. Ninety-five percent of those who attend church regularly want denominational schools; even among the "marginal" members of this group, 87 percent want schools that have a denominational character, and 36 percent of those who have definitely left the evangelical churches still want denominational schools. On the other hand, support for separate schools (54 percent) is now lower among marginal Catholics, who a generation or two ago would have lived in an almost entirely Catholic social and institutional world.

It should perhaps be noted here that the continuing attachment to some forms of confessional structuring of life—especially that affecting youth—has been accompanied by massive changes in attitudes about a variety of issues. For example, surveys have found that there is very little animosity or suspicion between Catholics and Protestants, and that both are as positive as are the unchurched toward the rights of Muslims to say and do what they will (Catholics 68 percent positive, evangelicals 69 percent, unchurched 67 percent).<sup>37</sup>

Although many social agencies and more than two-thirds of schools continue to claim a religious identity, there is considerable evidence that this has been "hollowed out" by decades of dependence upon the government as well as growing secularization. For example, there has been a perceptible decline in what has been a strong tradition of volunteering, or rather a diversion of the volunteering impulse toward groups seeking to promote causes—often in the Third World—and raise funds rather than provide direct help. "As the societal middle ground continues to lose its independence," Adriaansens and Zijderfeld point out, "volunteering changes its character and loses significance." The irony is that the new forms of volunteering directed toward affecting public policies themselves contribute to an ever-expanding state role and further weakening of the civil society.<sup>38</sup>

Alongside professionalization and the devaluing of volunteer help, the growing secularization and weakening of the denominational "pillars" has also changed the nature of the nonprofit organizations that provide social services and education. Organizations which had provided an all-encompassing religious sense of meaning within Catholic or Protestant subsocieties lost their taken-for-grantedness and became at best lifestyle choices and at worst shells stripped of all meaning.<sup>39</sup> Although one might expect that the Netherlands, where two-thirds of the schools have a religious identity, would be a paradise for religiously distinctive education, many Protestant and Catholic schools have become only residually religious. Some policy analysts argue that they

have thereby lost their *raison d'être* and should simply be taken over by the state.<sup>40</sup> In a period of declining enrollments and school closings, determining in practice the meaning of school distinctiveness acquires considerable importance. The availability of a nearby Catholic school, for example, would permit the closing of another that is underenrolled, even though the staff of the two schools might approach Catholic teaching from very different perspectives, with one stressing liberation theology and another the traditional catechism. Such situations are by no means unheard-of; indeed, as long ago as 1933 the Dutch government decided that a group of more conservative Protestant schools deserved to be treated as a separate category from the more liberal Protestant schools, creating a right on the part of a group of parents with a sufficient number of children to have the establishment of one sort of Protestant school funded even if the other sort was available locally.<sup>41</sup>

More recently the question has arisen whether a "neutral" private school, one that reflects no single belief or worldview but is distinctive only in terms of pedagogy, may be considered equivalent to a public school offering the same program and (by law) committed to the same religious neutrality. Is there, in other words, a right to such a private school distinct from any issue of conscience? An advisory opinion of the Education Council (*Onderwijsraad*) in May 1985 found that there is such a right, because even the deliberate lack of common convictions can be seen as a "philosophical foundation."<sup>42</sup>

Such discussions grow directly out of the perceived need to consolidate schools for budgetary purposes, but they also reflect developments in Dutch society in recent decades. First of these is the way that weakening of traditional religious loyalties has reduced not only church attendance but also commitment to institutions based upon religious identification. This secularization has led to questions about the continuing need for confessional schooling, at least on the present scale.

The second development, related in a complex fashion to the first, is a certain loss of nerve among those upon whom confessional schooling depends to confirm its purpose, from church hierarchies to teachers. If schools are no longer distinctively Catholic or Protestant beyond their labels, public school advocates ask, how does their maintenance with public funds guarantee liberty of conscience? Given the growing ethnic diversity of Dutch society, would it not be better to abandon confessional schooling in favor of a common school that would bridge not only confessional and class differences but ethnic ones as well?

Leaders of Catholic and Protestant schooling have been working for the past

twenty years to clarify the meaning of education on a Christian basis, and to help schools to work that out in the details of their daily activities. To accept Max Weber's separation between spheres of facts-without-values and values-without-facts, they argue, is fatal to creating the kinds of schools that are needed, because it suggests the possibility of adding on elements of moral teaching or character development as a supplement to the fundamental instructional mission of the school. Schools should rather integrate their entire program of instruction in subject matter and also development of character and the habits that sustain it into a single value-impregnated vision of what the school is about. A Christian school should not seek to express its religious character simply by a prayer at the beginning of the school day, or a period each week of religious instruction, or by reading from the Bible now and again. A serious engagement with what it means to be a Christian school would require that every aspect of the school be examined from that perspective.

This does not mean, they take care to point out, that a little flavoring, a little sauce of Christianity should be poured over every subject, but rather it means that in the entire teaching enterprise of the school there should be a fundamental seriousness about raising the important questions and addressing them from the perspective of a consistent framework of values and convictions. Specifically, when issues of worldview are being discussed, they should be discussed in relation to the competencies that pupils are developing in the school and not as a separate and otherworldly set of concerns. By the same token, when competencies are being developed and discussed, there should also be consideration of how and why they are being developed and for what purposes they will be used. As schools express their distinctiveness within the framework of general educational goals, this needs to be worked through in all the details of how the schools operate, of their distinctive character.

### France

The Netherlands and France serve almost as ideal types of how to think about and then design school autonomy and choice. While much of Dutch public life has long been organized along denominational lines, with extensive consultation among religious and secular pressure groups at every stage of decision making, in France there is an even longer history of conflict over religious issues. The French Republic is explicitly described as secular (*laïque*) in its constitution. Roughly from 1750 to 1950, secular humanism (in an evolving form) and Catholicism competed to serve as the basis for the unity of the French people, and that competition rarely admitted the possibility of a pluralistic resolu-

tion, as in the Netherlands. It was winner take all. Whenever Catholics had the top hand, they sought to make all schools Catholic, and whenever the secular forces were in the ascendancy, they sought to make it impossible to operate Catholic schools as an alternative to government schools.

For the past several decades, however, the national government has been funding the “secular instructional program” (though not the religious instruction) in Catholic schools. In what has been described as “a situation unprecedented since the French Revolution, the public school no longer is specifically responsible for defending the political institutions of the current State.” What is more, public support for funding nonpublic schools grew from 23 percent right after World War II to 46 percent in 1951 (with 42 percent opposed). Thirty-two percent of respondents favored full funding by 1974, 32 percent favored partial funding, and only 23 percent opposed any public funding of nonpublic schools.<sup>43</sup> A survey in 1983 found that 51 percent of those questioned were prepared to sign a petition in support of private education, compared with 28 percent who would sign one in support of a public-education monopoly. Even 30 percent of the Communist voters and 35 percent of the Socialists indicated support for private education. Two years earlier, 81 percent of the French people surveyed supported free choice of schools, with 30 percent in favor of making the government funding even more generous in order to render private education completely cost free.<sup>44</sup>

Under the *loi Debré*, enacted in 1959 and subsequently amended, the French government enters into contracts with more than 98 percent of the country’s nonpublic schools; their teachers are salaried in full by the national government, and other educational costs are paid as well. Fifteen percent of elementary pupils and 20 percent of secondary pupils attend nonpublic schools, the great majority of them Catholic. Careful research has demonstrated that more than one-third of all pupils in France obtain at least part of their schooling in nonpublic schools, for these have become an important resource for families (many not practicing Catholics) when their children are experiencing difficulties in the public schools. It has been estimated that about half of all French families with children make use of these schools at some point or other. The sociologist Robert Ballion describes middle-class parents as aggressive consumers of education for their children.<sup>45</sup>

Those who sponsor schools can choose whether to accept state requirements governing curriculum and testing in exchange for staff salaries (*contrat simple*), or to accept, in addition, some government control over pedagogy and the selection of teachers, in exchange for operating expenses as well as salaries (*con-*

*trat d’association*). To receive support under the *contrat d’association*, a school must demonstrate that it meets an educational need. Schools under either form of contract are required to teach the regular public school curriculum leading up to the state examinations (which they would do in any case, because there is no other way for their pupils to obtain university admission or vocational qualifications) but are explicitly protected in maintaining their distinctive religious character and may require that the state-salaried teachers respect that character. Although the teachers in Catholic schools under contract are paid by the national government on terms which are parallel to those of public school teachers, they are required to respect Catholic moral expectations: in a 1978 case, for example, the firing of a divorced-and-remarried teacher was upheld.<sup>46</sup>

Suspicion has persisted that government funding of nonstate education would lead to increasing government control, with private schools carried irresistibly by a sort of escalator effect into the public system. Such an intent was expressed by anticlerical forces in 1959: “If the private sector is destined to receive State aid, it is appropriate that it be subjected to the financial, administrative and pedagogical control” of the national Ministry of Education.<sup>47</sup> This expectation is the background of the major political crisis over education in the early 1980s, which led to the fall of a Socialist government. The government had declared its intention of forcing private schools under contract to conform more closely to the practices of the public system, especially with respect to employment of staff, and a massive mobilization of parents rallied successfully to defend the right to maintain the distinctive character of these schools.

The experience of other Western democracies demonstrates clearly that even in a society like France whose political culture is strongly opposed to a blurring of the lines between church and state, a reasonable accommodation can be reached over public education. Sooner (as in the case of Belgium) or later (as in the case of France), the political leadership in each of these democracies has put aside the rhetoric and focused upon the practical goal of ensuring the adequacy of the schools which all children attend, while respecting the wishes of many parents for faith-based schooling.

American policy making, by contrast, seems determined to turn its back on the nonpublic schools—many of them drastically underfunded—attended by millions of children, by no means all of them from financially secure families. In a free society, well-off parents cannot, in the name of justice, be prevented from giving their children a better quality of schooling by exercising residential decisions or by spending some of their wealth for private schooling. Only

through public subsidy of all schools that are of sufficient quality to meet the school-attendance obligation can the opportunity to choose among all available schools be at least partially detached from family resources. This equity issue is recognized explicitly in the German constitution and in the policies of the other Western democracies . . . but not, so far at least, in American public policy.

Subsidizing nonstate schools shows commendable respect for the religious liberty of families and concern for educational equity. It has also created a variety of problems, which would no doubt arise in the United States as well if, as seems probable, public funds were made more widely available to support faith-based schools.

One problem has to do with the regulation that grows up with public subsidies. Faith-based schools in the Netherlands, for example, are regulated by government to a far greater extent than are those in the United States; essentially, they are expected to meet all of the conditions required of the government's own schools, though with freedom to infuse the curriculum and instruction with religious perspectives.

It is well to keep in mind that government—in the United States as much as in Europe—is free to set such requirements for all schools that meet school-attendance requirements. Public funding does not have to lead to a greater degree of government interference, though in practice it usually does. The fine print of the arrangements through which public funding is provided is thus important.<sup>48</sup> The overregulation of nonstate schools in Europe is currently being addressed as part of the widespread efforts to reduce the overall burden of regulation and to promote the autonomy of all schools, state and nonstate alike.

Another problem arises from the effects of government funding. The additional resources provided encourage—indeed, require—the professionalization of teaching staff and their conformity to the standards set for teachers in the government's own schools. One of the results is that professionwide norms can come to be more influential than the mission of the particular school. This further source of pressure toward conformity to the public school model works against a flourishing pluralism in education.

The drift toward common secular norms makes it all the more urgent that those operating faith-based schools work at defining, elaborating, and maintaining their mission, what in France and Spain is called “distinctive character” and in the Netherlands “identity.” Hiring decisions, ongoing discussion and curriculum design, and regular events that express and reaffirm this mission for all participants in the school are vital.

That is easily said, less easily done. Educators find it difficult to resist feeling that the goal of their work must be to nurture autonomous individuals who have not been affected by the values and perspectives of their teachers—naïve and self-contradictory as that objective is. There is a tendency, as we have seen, to define a single model of maturity which all schools should strive to develop in their pupils—that of the autonomous individual—and to perceive approaches to education that seek to foster participation in communities and traditions as unworthy of the schools of a democratic society. The effort of some families to provide schooling for their children that reinforces their own convictions about life is seen, from this perspective, as something to be countered by educators and by the educator-state.<sup>49</sup>

Surely it is more appropriate in a free society for the state to extend its support to a variety of schools (of adequate quality) that provide education based upon alternative understandings of human flourishing, understandings based upon different concepts of what the German constitution protects as the “development of personality.” This requires a recognition that toleration and individualization are not in necessary opposition to what parents hold to be most deeply true and important for their children.

There is one more danger often attributed to educational diversity: the possibility that social divisions of all kinds will be exacerbated if the nation's children do not attend school together. For nineteenth-century reformers, this was the primary argument for the “common school,” especially in the face of massive immigration.<sup>50</sup>

Although warnings about social disintegration are a constant theme of opponents of various forms of parent choice of schools, there are three reasons why these warnings should not be taken too seriously. The first is that the experience of other Western democracies with publicly funded educational pluralism over the past eighty and more years does not provide any examples of social divisions as a result, despite constant predictions of disaster. France, the critics of Catholic schooling warned, would be torn apart by two conflicting groups of youth (*deux jeunesses*); of course, nothing of the sort has happened. Indeed, arrangements to provide equal access to religious schooling for those who wanted it was in several countries the way to bring peace after decades of conflict.

The second reason to minimize the social dangers associated with parent choice is that the attendance of faith-based schools by millions of American youngsters has not resulted in a divided society. They have turned out very much like other American youth, and a growing body of research suggests that

they have more commitment to tolerance, are more involved in service projects, and have more civic knowledge and skills than students in public schools.<sup>51</sup>

The third reason why those concerned with social justice can support parent choice of schools with a clear conscience is that by now we know a great deal about the nuts and bolts of how to make it function in a way that provides equal access for those children whose parents have less information and fewer resources. Hundreds of thousands of pupils have taken part in school choice programs in the United States, including some that have made parent choice the universal basis for school assignments.<sup>52</sup> These programs have been studied extensively to ensure that their effects are benign. While many mistakes have been made along the way, we have learned from them how to design equitable school-choice programs that respect the autonomy of distinctively different schools.

Parental choice, in short, is not an untried experiment. We should not allow ourselves to be frightened by unsubstantiated predictions of disaster. Young Americans who attend schools that their parents have chosen, schools with a coherent sense of mission that is translated into the details of curriculum and school life, are likely to receive a better education than those who are assigned to lowest-common-denominator schools. Isn't it time that the United States joined all the other Western democracies that consider it the responsibility of government to support parental choice among schools as a fundamental freedom?

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  46. Yves Madiot, "Le juge et la laïcité," in *Pouvoirs*, no. 75, *La laïcité* (1995): 76.
  47. Leclerc, *La bataille de l'école*, pp. 72–73.
  48. Glenn, *Ambiguous Embrace*.
  49. See, for example, Amy Gutmann, *Democratic Education* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), or, more recently, James G. Dwyer, *Religious Schools v. Children's Rights* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).
  50. Glenn, *Myth of the Common School*.
  51. Several as-yet-unpublished studies to this effect were presented at the March 2000 conference on Charter Schools, Vouchers, and Public Education at the Kennedy School, Harvard.
  52. Charles L. Glenn, "Controlled Choice in Massachusetts Public Schools," *Public Interest* 103 (April 1991).